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HOW COMFORTABLE WILL OUR DESCENDENTS BE WITH THE CHOICES
WE’VE MADE TODAY?
Gaddis, John Lewis. Surprise, Security, and the American Experience. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ.
Press, 2004. 150pp. $18.95

John Lewis Gaddis is the Robert A.
Lovell Professor of History at Yale University and one of the preeminent historians of American, particularly Cold
War, security policy. Surprise, Security,
and the American Experience is based on
a series of lectures given by the author
in 2002 addressing the implications for
American security after the 11 September attacks. It is a succinct and masterful statement of the central national
security dilemma that presently faces us.
For many, especially critics of the current administration, President Bush’s
post-9/11 policies in response to the
threat presented by militant Islamism
represent a radical and scary departure
from historical U.S. policy. Many putatively are aghast at the introduction of
preemptive/preventive war into the National Security Strategy adopted in September 2002 and the apparent shift to a
harsh hegemonic unilateralism.
Gaddis argues that far from being a
radical departure, the Bush administration’s response to the attacks represents
considerable continuity with American
historical tradition. Twice before in
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U.S. history, American assumptions
about national security were shattered
by surprise attack, and each time U.S.
grand strategy profoundly changed as a
result.
After the British attack on Washington,
D.C., in 1814, John Quincy Adams as
secretary of state articulated three principles to secure the American homeland
against external attack: preemption,
unilateralism, and hegemony. The
Monroe Doctrine, proclaiming American hegemony in the Western Hemisphere, was declared unilaterally and
preemptively in reaction to the Spanish
empire’s collapse in Latin America
(though in practice it was enforced by
British naval supremacy, not American
power).
For over a century, the United States
expanded its territory and influence
through force majeure exercised against
“failing states,” another phenomenon by
no means new in our times. Florida was
ceded by Spain under pressure in 1810,
Texas and the Southwest were taken from
a chaotic Mexico in the mid-nineteenth
century, overseas Spanish possessions
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were seized in 1898 after an ostensible
“terrorist” attack on USS Maine, and
myriad lesser interventions took place in
Latin America and the Caribbean. Fear
of multilateral entanglement peaked
with insistence on being an “associated
power” during World War I, rejection
of the League of Nations, and pre–
World War II isolationism. America remained content with hegemony in the
Western Hemisphere and unilateralism
in dealings with other nations and international organizations; preemption of
the dictators in the 1930s, always infeasible domestically, would have been
impossible given European democracies’
appeasement policies.
Transportation revolutions from the
late nineteenth century onward diminished the value of geographical separation that underpinned this strategy, as
spectacularly proven by the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December
1941. Obliged by necessity—the United
States had insufficient power to defeat
both Germany and Japan in a reasonable amount of time and at an acceptable cost—to depart radically from
unilateralism, President Franklin D.
Roosevelt moved quickly to establish a
“Grand Alliance” with Britain and the
Soviet Union.
By the end of World War II, America
“was able to move in a remarkably
short period of time from a strategy
that had limited itself to controlling the
western hemisphere to one aimed at
winning a global war and managing the
peace that would follow. Equally significant is the fact that FDR pulled off this
expanded hegemony by scrapping
rather than embracing the two other
key components of Adams’ strategy,
unilateralism and preemption.”
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To keep allies with widely disparate war
aims together, FDR sought to “embed
conflicting unilateral priorities within a
cooperative multilateral framework. . . .
If the present war could provide the incentive to build structures and procedures that would prevent new [wars],
then all would benefit.” Absent this,
“there was sure to be something worse,
whether in the form of a less than decisive victory against Germany and Japan,
or a postwar economic collapse, or even
a replay of the post–World War I retreat by the United States back into the
unilateralism of the nineteenth century
that had . . . contributed to the coming
of World War II. The result was de
facto American hegemony, but in contrast to anything John Quincy Adams
could ever have imagined, it was to arise
by consent.”
Gaddis argues that this was the radical
departure in U.S. security policy, not
what has happened since 11 September.
Since World War II, the underlying
principle vis-à-vis other nations was
that “there should always be something
worse than the prospect of American
domination,” a condition easy to maintain during the Cold War standoff with
the Soviet Union. This ensured an
“asymmetry of legitimacy” between the
United States and the Soviet Union that
“did much to determine how the Cold
War was fought and who would ultimately win it.” Preemption as policy
routinely was rejected on the basis that,
given the lessons of the bloody world
wars, an impossibly high moral ante
was needed to justify starting a war and
incurring the inevitable costs for an unknown benefit, even in the face of a
clear and present danger.
But what if there is no longer “something worse”? One curious question
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post–Cold War is why there have been
no serious efforts among other nations
to build countervailing groupings to
“balance” near-hegemonic U.S. global
power, French urgings notwithstanding. “The reason, very likely, was the
habit of self-restraint Americans had
developed—because they had had to—
during the Cold War, a habit they did
not entirely relinquish after it ended.”
The shocking and lethal nature of the
9/11 attacks, coupled with the fact that
they had been executed by a mere
group of zealots, resulted in a rapid,
radical change in U.S. national security
strategy. Key Cold War assumptions no
longer applied. The post–Cold War international environment was not benign; terrorists were neither deterrable
nor containable like states but potentially had equivalent lethality; the international state system had declining
authority; and there was no longer a
security environment in which all the
players knew and respected the rules.
The 2002 National Security Strategy
avers that the United States will “identify and eliminate terrorists wherever
they are, together with the regimes that
sustain them.” Though multilateral action is preferred (“The United States
will constantly strive to enlist the support of the international community”),
unilateral preemption may be necessary
(“We cannot let our enemies strike
first.”). The United States will maintain
de facto hegemonic power sufficient “to
dissuade potential adversaries from
pursuing a military build-up in hopes
of surpassing, or equaling, the power of
the United States.” The strategy seeks to
make such implicit hegemonic power
palatable by linking it to such universal
principles as “No people on earth yearn
to be oppressed, aspire to servitude, or
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eagerly await the midnight knock of the
secret police.” Lastly, the strategy and
subsequent policy statements argue that
terrorism (that we care about) is
spawned largely by the lack of representative institutions in tyrannical regimes;
thus “terrorism—and by implication
the authoritarianism that breeds it—
must become as obsolete as slavery, piracy, or genocide” through the spread
of democracy. Gaddis finds much to respect in this strategy, particularly its intellectual coherence. However, he notes
glaring flaws in its execution. The
“most obvious failure has to do with
the relationship between preemption,
hegemony, and consent.” The run-up to
and aftermath of the Iraqi war have
raised doubts about the willingness of
much of the world to consent to American hegemony if used to preempt in the
absence of compellingly clear and present danger, doubts aggravated by the
fact that the Bush administration “has
never deployed language with anything
like the care it has taken in deploying its
military capabilities.” It is this lack of
multilateral “consent”—and the supposed departure from widely accepted
historical norms—that has animated
much of the opposition to current policies both at home and abroad.
This poses a problem that will not soon
disappear. As Gaddis notes, “the means
we choose in this post-September 11th
environment could wind up undermining the ends we seek. It is also possible,
though, that the ends we seek, given the
new threats we face, can be achieved
only by means different from those that
won World War II and the Cold War.
This much at least is clear: the dilemma
is a difficult one, and its resolution will
largely determine the relationship
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between surprise, security, and the
American experience in the 21st
century.”
Gaddis closes with a poignant anecdote.
One of his Yale undergraduates “asked
in the dark and fearful days that followed September 11th, ‘Would it be OK
now for us to be patriotic?’ ” to which
he responds, “Yes, I think it would.” This
is a commentary both on the smug
self-indulgence of many elites during
America’s post–Cold War “vacation
from history” and on the uncomfortable “disconnection in our thinking between the security to which we’ve
become accustomed and the means by
which we obtained it.” It is intellectually fashionable in many venues today
to condemn the sometimes morally ambiguous policies that have nonetheless
brought us the national security we historically have taken for granted. But as
Gaddis notes: “The better approach, I
think, is to acknowledge the moral ambiguity of our history. Like most other
nations, we got to where we are by
means that we cannot today, in their
entirety, comfortably endorse. Comfort
alone, however, cannot be the criterion
by which a nation shapes its strategy
and secures its safety. The means of
confronting danger do not disqualify
themselves from consideration solely
on the basis of the uneasiness they produce. Before we too quickly condemn
how our ancestors dealt with such
problems, therefore, we might well ask
ourselves two questions: What would
we have done if we had been in their
place then? And, even scarier, how
comfortable will our descendants be
with the choices we make today?”
JAN VAN TOL

Captain, U.S. Navy
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Burke, Jason. Al-Qaeda: Casting a Shadow of Terror. New York: I. B. Tauris, 2003. 304pp. $24.95

As the United States enters its fifth year
in the war on terrorism, too little is
known about al-Qa‘ida. Though several
top al-Qa‘ida operatives, like Khalid
Shaikh Mohammed, are now in custody, and detainee reporting from
Guantanamo Bay, Bagram Airbase, and
other locations provides a historical
snapshot of the pre-9/11 organization
led by Usama Bin Laden, the United
States still lacks the vocabulary to understand how and why terrorism
threatens. This is partly due to the impact of global counterterrorist operations (the Congressional Research
Services notes that three thousand suspected al-Qa‘ida members have been
detained by about ninety countries),
conflicting strategies within Bin Laden’s
organization (global legion of militants
or global inspiration), and the diversity
of groups that compose contemporary
depictions of al-Qa‘ida (the Egyptian
al-Jihad, the Indonesian Jemaah
Islamiyah, or the Kashmiri Haarakat
ul-Mujahidin, to name three of the
many disparate nationalist groups
lumped together with al-Qa‘ida).
Jason Burke, a chief reporter for the
London Observer who spent about four
years in Pakistan and Afghanistan, argues that al-Qa‘ida (Arabic for “the
base of operation” or “foundation”) is
an overused term and mischaracterizes
the nature of international terrorism. In
contrast to the pre-9/11 view that Bin
Laden is al-Qa‘ida, or the post–Operation
ENDURING FREEDOM (Afghanistan)
view that al-Qa‘ida is a global coalition
of factions, Burke argues it is less an organization than an ideology. “Osama
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